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Elderly Health, Wealth and Coresidence  
with Adult Children in Rural India 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Population is ageing in most countries today though the implications of ageing are more serious 
for developing countries like India where there are problems of earning from assets in old age, 
where credit and insurance markets are poorly developed and where there is no tradition of extra 
familial welfare institutions.1 Traditionally elderly persons in India tend to predominantly 
coreside with children, who bear the burden of caring for the elderly parents though little is 
known about the living conditions of a growing number of elderly in India. In this context the 
present paper examines the nature of intergenerational transfers among coresident elderly in rural 
India.  
 Existing literature is diverse and yet limited, especially for low-income countries.  
These studies tend to highlight the importance of financial resources (e.g., financial support from 
adult children2 or elderly person’s accumulated wealth) as old age security in low-income 
regions, generally characterised by poverty and lack of personal wealth as well as absence of any 
extra-familial welfare institutions. First, population and development theorists tend to highlight 
the fertility motive for old age security whereby children are the main source of old age security 
in low-income countries. This literature focuses on (a) role of parental wealth (Raut, 1996) and 
also how wealthy parents can induce greater assistance from children (Hoddinott, 1992). (b) 
Uncertainty of expected transfer from children on demand for children (Jellal and Wolff, 2002). 
                                                 
1
 Majority of the older people in India work outside the formal sector and lack the capacity to save. Only 1 in 10 Indian 
workers participates in some pension schemes (World Bank, 1994). 
 
2
 Nugent and Gillaspy (1983) argued that social security may act as a substitute for children.  
 2 
A second strand of the literature argues that intergenerational transfers are dominated by the 
financial support from adult children to elderly parents (e.g., see Kochar, 2000). Justifications for 
the financial transfers may include altruism of family members, returns to parental investment in 
education of young children (Lillard and Willis, 1997), payments for services (e.g., child care) by 
family members. Finally, a third strand of the literature directly examines the determinants of 
coresidency with children in some low-income countries and among other things highlight the 
role of parental income or housing prices (e.g., see Da Vanzo and Chan, 1994) on coresidency 
with children while some others (e.g., see Cameron, 2000) report only small effects of these 
economic variables on elderly coresidency arrangements.  
 These existing studies tend to highlight the role of parental wealth and also 
the financial transfers from adult children to elderly parents. In doing so, the literature, 
not only overlooks the role of various non-financial services provided adult by children 
(e.g., health3 and other personal care, especially for the frail and sick ones) in old age4, 
but also the reverse flow of services from elderly parents to their adult children (e.g., 
participation various household chores, including looking after young grand children) 
well into their old age.5 Accordingly, the present paper examines the significance of 
various financial and other non-financial contributions made by the elderly as well as 
their adult children on coresidency. In doing so, we integrate various strands of the 
literature and argue that mutual sharing of responsibilities is particularly important in 
coresidency arrangements (though overlooked not only in the transfer literature but also 
                                                 
3
 Kochar (1999) argues that medical expenditures on the elderly in rural Pakistan declines with elderly person’s 
declining economic contributions which is closely related to a sharp decline in wages rates with age.  
4
 An exception is Hoddinott (1992), who considered both financial and other types of assistance, provided 
by children and argued that elderly parents in western Kenya can induce greater assistance with household 
tasks and also monetary transfers if they have more inheritable assets. 
5
 This especially important in view of the Indian philosophy of ‘Karma’ where death is really the only retirement for 
most elderly. Literally, ‘karma’ is a Sanskrit word meaning work or action. Karma is not only a philosophy but 
also a way of life according to an ethical code of conduct through which we can change our lives.  
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in the direct determination of coresidency arrangements) between elderly parents and 
adult children. Decision of coresidence is a joint decision and depends on the comparison 
of each agent’s (elderly parent or adult children) utility levels when living alone and 
when coresiding. The empirical analysis is based on the 52nd round National Sample 
Survey (NSS) data from the rural sectors of the Indian states. This is a special round of 
the NSS that collects additional information on the elderly members of sample 
households living in different states of India. We choose to focus on the rural households 
because of the greater poverty and vulnerability of the elderly people residing in the rural 
sector. Unlike their urban counterparts, many rural elderly lack financial assets and/or 
property. A majority of rural Indians tend to work in the informal sector where there is no 
provision of regular income after retirement.  
The paper is novel in a number of ways. We depart from the existing literature to argue 
that an elderly person’s coresidence with children is an important aspect of intergenerational 
transfers6, involving transfers not only in terms of housing consumption, but also other financial 
and non-financial exchanges between elderly parents and adult children in a mutually beneficial 
way. On the one hand, children may provide financial and other personal assistance to their 
elderly parents. On the other hand, elderly parents too continue to contribute to the family both 
financially and otherwise well into their old age. Thus we are able to assess the relative 
significance of each contribution in our analysis. Secondly, subject to the data limitations (see 
discussion in section 3), our analysis distinguishes between (a) financial and non-financial 
assistance from children and (b) financial and non-financial assistance from elderly parents. 
While we directly observe if elderly parents are financially dependent on children, we do not 
observe elderly parents’ personal/medical dependence on coresident children; we, however, use 
an elderly person’s intensity of actual health problems to be an indicator of their dependence on 
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coresident children for personal/medical care. So far as the contributions of an elderly person are 
concerned, we use their ownership of property and/or financial assets (also called wealth) as a 
good index of their financial contribution. Non-financial contribution on the other hand is 
measured by a composite index of elderly person’s participation in daily household chores, social 
and religious matters. Finally, modelling coresidence in terms of financial and non-financial 
contributions of children and elderly members of the household is far from being straightforward. 
For one thing, there are serious self-selection issues to be sorted out – otherwise estimates of 
single coresidency equation in terms of financial and non-financial contributions of adult children 
and elderly parents will be biased. This is because an elderly person who owns wealth and/or 
contributes otherwise to the family is not a random subset of all elderly members coresiding with 
children; similarly, coresident adult children who may assist elderly parents financially and 
otherwise are not a random subset of all adult children. Thus the correlation between any pair of 
unobserved error terms in these relevant decisions (e.g., that pertaining to elderly health, wealth 
or participation in household chores) is likely to be non-zero. Traditional approach to solve this 
kind of endogeneity problem would be to identify the relevant instruments for these variables 
(e.g., elderly person’s financial dependence on children or his/her ownership of wealth) and then 
estimate the coresidence equation using instrumental variable method. It is however not so simple 
to find appropriate instruments for these decisions, especially in single cross-section data-set. Our 
approach to solve this problem has been to use a correlated recursive system of equations 
comprising of elderly person’s financial dependence on children, intensity of elderly health 
problems (as a measure of non-financial dependence on children), elderly person’s ownership of 
wealth as well as their participation in various household chores (as measures of elderly person’s 
contribution to the family) along with the coresidence equation. In other words, we allow for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
6
 Generally home sharing arrangement is considered to be an important part of family redistributive efforts. 
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source of endogeneity (i.e., cross-correlations between these decisions) in the relevant equations 
and correct for the possible endogeneity, which otherwise could seriously bias the estimates. 7 
Our results highlight the extent of the bias if we do not address the endogeneity issues. 
These corrected estimates also suggest that financial dependence on children is not important for  
coresidence while an elderly person’s wealth and participation in daily household chores are 
highly significant: for a given health status, a wealthy elderly person is less likely to coreside 
while for a given wealth, an elderly person is more likely to coreside if s/he is able to participate 
in household chores. These results raise concern for those elderly who do not have health, wealth 
or both or disadvantaged in other ways (e.g., older elderly or widowed elderly female0. Unless 
policies and social protection schemes specifically address issues of the old age poverty,8 targets 
for poverty reduction will not be achieved.  
   The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and section 3 explains 
the methodology. Section 4 analyses the results and the final section concludes.   
 
 
2. DATA  
We use the fifty-second round NSS data from the rural sector of different states and union 
territories in India collected in 1995-96. This particular round of NSS data provides additional 
information on the elderly members of the sample households, aged sixty years and above. In 
particular, we observe living arrangements, state of economic dependence, 
ownership/management of financial assets and/or properties, actual health problems of the elderly 
as well as their participation in daily household chores and social/religious matters.  
                                                 
7
 These correlated estimates would also be better than the fixed effects single equation logit estimates of 
coresidency in terms of elderly wealth, participation in household work, financial dependence on children 
and intensity of health problems, among other possible covariates. Although the fixed effects estimates take 
account of family fixed effects (something like the unobserved heterogeneity terms in our model), it does 
not allow for non-zero correlations between each pair of unobserved heterogeneity terms.  
8
 There are no official data on the income of the elderly in India. 
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2.1. Nature of living arrangements in rural India 
The data-set includes elderly members aged sixty or above of different marital status living in the 
rural sector of different states in India. We have excluded the never married elderly members 
from our analysis as none of them had any children in our sample. The sample of elderly 
members consists of household head, his/her spouse, parents or parents-in-law and other relations 
or non-relations of the head of the household. We however choose to consider the head and  
his/her spouse aged sixty or above as we can identify the characteristics of their children (that 
feature prominently in our analysis of old age security), which is not possible for other elderly 
members.9 This gives rise to a sample size of 13810 elderly members.    
Information on co-residence with children is obtained from the pattern of living 
arrangements. We can identify if someone is living with spouse and children or with children 
only (without the spouse). The latter is closely related to the marital status of the elderly persons:  
while a majority of currently married elderly members with children co-reside with spouse and 
children, a majority of widowed/separated elderly members with children co-reside with children 
only. However, a majority of currently married elderly members without children co-reside with 
spouse only. Other types of living arrangements are also observed, e.g., whether someone is 
living on his/her own, or in an old home or living with other relations or even non-relations, 
though the proportions of cases are not that significant in our sample. Selected characteristics of 
all elderly members with different types of living arrangements are summarised in Table 1A.10 A 
clearer pattern is found when we distinguish between elderly persons with/without children. As 
high as 98% of both married and widowed elderly members with children tend to coreside with 
                                                 
9
 Compared to the non-household head elderly members (34% of the full sample comprising of parents/parents-in-law 
and other types of relatives), this may be a sample of better-off elderly. We needed to focus on this group of elderly 
heads and their spouses as we needed information on all their children. We however intend to study the case of non-
household head elderly in a separate paper. 
10
 All figures are adjusted by sample weights. 
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children (with or without the spouse).11 In contrast, considering the elderly members without 
children, about 95% of currently married men and women live with spouse only; 68% widowed 
women and 47% widowed men live on their own or in an old home while others tend to live with 
other relations or non-relations. Thus in the absence of any extra familial traditions of old age 
security, elderly men and women without children are more vulnerable than those with children 
and co-residing with children (with or without spouse) though in this paper we focus only on 
elderly men and women with children. 
Table 1B compares some selected characteristics of elderly members with children in 
three different modes of living arrangements: (a) those living with children (with or without 
spouse), (b) those living with spouse only and (c) those living alone, in old home or with other 
non-relations.12 Clearly, a higher proportion of elderly persons living with children tend to own 
properties and financial assets while a lower proportion of them have made provision of regular 
income. Secondly, a lower proportion of elderly members living with children suffer from chronic 
illness, physical disability or immobility. Thirdly, proportion of   elderly members participating in 
social and religious matters is high and comparable across these different living arrangements 
though the proportion of them participating in daily household chores is slightly lower among 
those living with children.   
 Finally, we compare the average per capita household expenditure (APCE) for elderly 
persons in different living arrangements and also examine the sensitivity of (a) equivalence scale 
adjusted APCE to different choice of weights given to adult (>=15 years) male, adult female and 
children (0-14 years old) respectively: (1,1,0.6), (1,0.8,0.6), (1,0.7,0.5). (b) We also examine the 
sensitivity of APCE for various choice of weights for the size economies of consumption, 
namely, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, & 0.2 to compare adjusted APCE among different living arrangements.13 
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  We note that more than 90% of these elderly members have at least one son coresiding with them. So it is highly 
likely that most of them tend to coreside with sons.   
12
 Only a third of the elderly living on their own has children or relatives living in the same village/town. 
13
 Note that a lower weight is associated with greater size economies in consumption. 
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Both unadjusted and adjusted APCE are shown in Table 1C. While the unadjusted APCE does 
not seem to vary much between alternative living arrangements, equivalence scale adjusted APCE 
figures are significantly higher for elderly persons living with children irrespective of the choice 
of weights. The same holds for different choices of size economies in consumption, even when 
there are smaller economies of scale. These figures seems to suggest that coresident elderly 
persons make significant contribution to the family well into their old age, which is generally 
overlooked in the literature (see Pal and Palacios, 2006 for an inter-state comparison). 
 
 
3. AN ANALYSIS OF CORESIDENCE WITH CHILDREN  
In view of our preliminary findings in section 2, we argue that elderly persons’ co-residence with 
children (and thus children’s co-residence with elderly parents) is likely to be a mutually 
advantageous arrangement in rural India. This could be rationalised in terms of a cooperative 
bargaining framework. Suppose the utility functions of the child (C) and the parent (P) are 
respectively characterised as follows: 
 
UC = UC(XC, AP , HP, LP , LC) 
UP = UP(XP, AP, LP, HP, TRC) 
 
where Xi  and Li are respectively the vector of private goods and leisure enjoyed by i, i = C, P 
respectively for the child (C) and the parent (P). Elderly parents receive financial transfer TRC 
from the child while both the child and the parent enjoy the parental assets AP  (joint consumption 
of parental house14 is an essential part of coresidency arrangement) to enhance individual utilities 
of the child and the parent). In addition, a child’s utility is assumed to increase with parental 
                                                 
14
 This will especially be the case if the assets include the parents’ residential home. 
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health HP 15 while an elderly parent’s utility increases with financial transfer TRC from children. 
Also note that elderly leisure LP (net of participation in various household chores and labour 
market, if any) is an argument in child’s utility function16 and there could arise some conflict of 
interest in this respect: for example, greater elderly leisure LP will enhance elderly utility, but is 
expected to lower children’s utility as this would mean lower parental involvement in child-
related services (e.g., care of the grand children or help with daily household chores).                                                                      
Elderly parents and the child may either live independently or they may collude to form a 
joint household. We suppose that in isolation, the parent and the child simultaneously make their 
own decisions (i.e., each will maximise individual utility subject to own budget constraint), taking 
the decision of the other to be given (corresponding to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for example). 
The latter would yield two reaction functions, which in turn will determine the optimal levels of 
indirect utility (µC, µP) that each will enjoy in isolation. In case they decide to coreside, they will 
jointly maximise the product of each individual gain (relative to their respective threat points µC, 
µP in isolation) subject to the joint budget constraint (corresponding to a Nash bargaining 
solution, for example). Consequently, the coresidency decision will be determined in terms of 
individual contributions of both the adult children (financial transfer TRC as well as personal care 
related to an elderly parent’s health status HP) and elderly parents (own assets AP and leisure LP 
that in turn determines the value of their labour services at home and/or in the market place17) 
choosing to coreside. 
                                                 
15
 There could be an aspect of altruism; but more realistically, an elderly person’s health problems could be 
viewed as a cause for concern for the coresident child who is responsible for looking after the elderly when 
sick and frail.  
16
 Note that child’s leisure does not enter parental utility function.  
17
 Note that in this paper we do not consider the value of an elderly person’s labour market participation 
because that raise further endogeneity issues and has been discussed elsewhere (e.g., see Cameron and 
Clark, 2001).  
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Thus in this paper we distinguish between financial and other non-financial 
contributions18 of both elderly parents and their adult children and also study the impact of these 
two-way contributions on coresidency arrangements. Although we attempt to highlight the two-
way flow of services between elderly parents and co-resident adult children, we are constrained 
by the availability of some relevant information. For example, there is information whether an 
elderly member is financially dependent on their own children though we cannot identify whether 
elderly parents receive financial support from co-resident or non-coresident children. We cannot 
also identify if assistance is provided by a son/daughter - married/unmarried. The data-set also 
does not provide any further information regarding the types of non-financial assistance children 
may provide to their elderly parents. Thus, motives are not always directly observable and hence 
one needs to identify indirectly the a priori circumstances that may influence the intensity of the 
motive for co-residence.   
 We consider a static one period framework and posit, without much loss of generality, 
that current coresidence with children would among others be determined by the financial and 
other contributions of the elderly person and his/her adult children. This allows us to abstract 
from the dynamics of family formation as well as life-cycle consumption and labour market 
decisions. Financial contribution of adult children is directly observed in our data in terms of 
whether the elderly person is financially dependent on children (FINDEP). While we do not 
directly observe medical and other personal care offered by coresident children, we argue that the 
intensity of health problems of the elderly would be a good measure of the care offered by 
coresident children. We derive a composite health indicator (HLTHPR) from three indicators of 
actual health problems: (i) chronic illness (e.g., heart problem, blood pressure, diabetes etc.); (ii) 
physical disability (e.g., hearing, vision, speech etc.) and (iii) physical immobility (confined to 
                                                 
18
 Previous literature (mostly for developed countries) tends to identify resources of the elderly including income 
(Englehardt et al. 2002), wealth, health (Mutchler and Burr, 1991) and kinship status to be important factors affecting 
living arrangement choices. Association between change in functional ability, or marital status on the one hand and 
living arrangements on the other is also documented in the literature (e.g., Worobey and Angel, 1990; Spitze et al, 
1992).  
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bed or home). The resultant variable HLTHPR is a categorical one: it takes a value 1 if the elderly 
person suffers from one of these problems; 2 if the elderly person suffers from two of these 
problems and 3 if the elderly person suffers from all three of these health problems and zero 
otherwise.19 In other words, the health status variable is a measure of intensity of health problems 
faced by the elderly person which in turn would instrument the intensity of personal care offered 
by coresident children.  
So far as the contribution of the elderly person is concerned, again we distinguish 
between financial and other services provided by them. We use a composite wealth indicator 
(PROPFA) to measure the financial contribution of an elderly. The variable PROPFA takes a 
value 1 if the elderly person owns any property20 and/or financial assets and zero otherwise. So 
far as the non-financial contribution of the elderly is concerned, we use a composite measure 
whether the elderly person participates in daily household chores, religious and social matters 
(HWORK).  
 The complete model would also control for a number individual/household 
specific factors as discussed in the following section.   
 
3.1. Modelling Coresidency  
 
The primary variable of our interest is the coresidence with children.  
    CORESIDE = 1 if an elderly lives with children (with/without spouse)  
  = 0 otherwise 
Thus for an elderly person i from a household j, the decision to coreside is given by: 
uXCORESIDE cijcjcij ++= ηβ  where Xc is a set of observable individual/household 
                                                 
19
 It is also worth emphasizing here that the indicators of health used in our analysis are measures of actual health 
problems, rather than the instrumental activities of daily living.  Hence, we do not need to treat health as a latent 
immeasurable variable. 
 
20
 While we do not specifically know if the family house is owned by an elderly person, elderly person’s ownership of 
property is taken to be a measure of his/her ownership of family house.  
 12 
characteristics explaining coresidence. ηc (family-specific) and uc (individual-specific) capture 
residual variation (see further discussion below). 
Specification of XC : Co-residence with children depends not only on age (whether the 
elderly person is aged 75 or more, i.e., AGE75)21, gender (MALE), schooling (primary or higher) 
and marital status (i.e., whether has a spouse of not, WIDSEP) of the elderly person, but also on 
measures of financial dependence on children (FINDEP), intensity of health problems 
(HLTHPR), wealth (PROPFA), as well as his/her participation in daily household chores, social 
and religious matters (HWORK). We also control for the regional variation in the pattern of 
elderly living arrangements by including a number of regional dummies (EAST, NORTH1, 
NORTH2, SOUTH).22 These regional dummies would account for the inter-state variation in 
socio-economic set-up and/or public assistance offered to the elderly (e.g., see Pal and Palacios, 
2006).  
In addition to the observable characteristics explained above, it is likely that household-
level unobserved heterogeneity may be significant in explaining coresidence with children in our 
sample. For example, we do not observe the life cycle income or consumption profile of the 
elderly person or wealth of other members of the household, though the latter could affect the 
living arrangements significantly. In our analysis this household/family specific unobserved 
heterogeneity is accounted for by ηc where ( )2~ 0,c cNη σ  is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
other covariates.23 All other individual-level residual variation is captured by uC: 
)1,0(~ IIDNuC .   
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 We identify older elderly aged 75 or more from all elderly (aged 60 and above) as Pal and Palacios 
(2006) suggest that compared to all elderly (60+) labour market participation rate declines sharply among 
older elderly (75+). 
22
 For definitions of these variables, see note to Table 3.  
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   3.2. Endogeneity issues 
Addressing endogeneity is a difficult problem in our analysis where an elderly person’s 
coresidence with their children depends, among others, on financial support from adult children, 
elderly person’s health, wealth as well as their participation in daily household chores. Even if we 
could assume marital status, education and past employment of the elderly person to be given 
within a static one-period framework, we need to address the bias generated by the correlations 
between elderly person’s coresidence with children on the one hand, and their current wealth, 
health, participation in various household chores and financial dependence on adult children on 
the other. Ignoring this simultaneity is likely to bias our estimates. To redress this problem, we 
determine the coresidency decision jointly with wealth, health, participation in household chores 
and financial dependence on children as a recursive correlated system of equations. This is 
explained below. 
Firstly, a possible source of simultaneity arises from the inclusion of financial 
dependence on children (FINDEP). This is because financial support from adult children to 
elderly parents is a reflection of the human capital investment by the same parents when children 
were young.24 So the equation that we estimate here is as follows: 
uXFINDEP DijDjDDij ++= ηβ  where XD refers to a vector of explanatory variables (see 
Table 3A), ηD captures family-specific unobserved heterogeneity and uD captures any other 
residual variation: ),0(~ 2ση DD N  and is uncorrelated with all other covariates while 
)1,0(IIDNu D = . 
The second possible simultaneity arises with respect to the inclusion of current health 
problems (HLTHPR) into the coresidency equation. On the one hand, given the health problems, 
                                                                                                                                                 
23
 This is a standard assumption in random effects panel data model of this type. 
24
 Since the same elderly person takes both decisions, i.e., investing in young children and deciding whether 
to accept financial transfer from these children and also whether to coreside, there is likely to be a 
correlation between these decisions. 
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an elderly person may decide to coreside with children. On the other hand, there is some literature 
suggesting that choice of residential location may affect health (e.g., Borsch Supan et al., 1996). 
Given this possibility of simultaneity between co-residence and health problems, we estimate the 
following equation for i-th elderly living in j-th household: 
uXHLTHPROB HijHjHHij ++= ηβ where XH refers to a vector of 
household/individual specific explanatory variables (see Table 3A), ηH captures 
unobserved heterogeneity (family-specific) and uH captures any other residual variation 
such that ),0(~ 2ση HH N  and is uncorrelated with all other covariates and 
)1,0(IIDNu H = . 
Elderly person’s current wealth as measured by the ownership of financial assets and/or 
properties (PROPFA) could be a further source of simultaneity. This is because current wealth is 
a reflection of past economic activities as well as savings behaviour of the elderly over the life 
cycle with a view to provide for the old age, among other things. In other words, current wealth is 
an alternative form of old-age insurance and therefore is likely to have two-way effects between 
wealth and current living arrangements. In an attempt to address this problem, we estimate the 
following wealth equation for the i-th elderly living in j-th household: 
uxPROPFA WijWjWWij ++= ηβ where XW refers to a vector of explanatory variables 
affecting wealth, ηW captures family/household-level unobserved heterogeneity and uF captures 
any other residual variation where ),0(~ 2ση WW N  and is uncorrelated with all other covariates 
and )1,0(IIDNuW = . List of explanatory variables included in the wealth equation is 
summarised in Table 3A. 
 Finally, an elderly person’s participation in daily household chores (HWORK) 
could also generate some simultaneity bias in the estimates of coresidency as there could 
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be a two-way causality between the two. In an attempt to redress this, we estimate the 
following participation equation: uxHWORK PijPjPPij ++= ηβ . As before XP refers to a 
vector of explanatory variables affecting participation, ηP captures unobserved household-level 
heterogeneity and uP any other residual variation: ),0(~ 2ση PP N  and is uncorrelated with all 
other covariates while )1,0(IIDNu P = . List of explanatory variables included in the wealth 
equation is summarised in Table 3A. 
 Four of the relevant decision variables, namely, CORESIDE, PROPFA, HWORK and 
FINDEP are binary in nature while the health variable (HLTHPR) is a categorical variable 
assuming values 0, 1, 2, 3. Accordingly, we use a multinomial logit model to estimate the health 
equation while we use univariate probit models to estimate the other four equations determining 
the binary dependent variables.  
In order to build up a coherent model (see Maddala, 1982 pp. 117-125), we develop a 
recursive system of equations such that the summed probability over all possible outcome 
combinations is equal to one. Thus we do not allow for any interdependence between/among 
financial dependence (FINDEP), health (HLTHPR), wealth (PROPFA), and participation 
(HWORK) equations. However in the completely correlated model decision to coreside with 
children (CORESIDE) could be correlated with the unobserved family specific error terms in the 
four auxiliary equations (e.g., financial dependence, health problems, wealth and participation 
equations; see specification 5 below).25  
Identification of the system is not only ensured by the non-linear nature of the likelihood, 
but also by the recursive nature of the model. Thus, the coresidency equation is clearly identified 
by the inclusion of an elderly person’s financial dependence on children, intensity of health 
                                                 
25
 There could also be some interaction between financial dependence on children and the wealth of the elderly; 
similarly, one cannot also rule out the possible interaction between intensity of health problems and participation in 
daily household chores. In order to address this issue, we also include two additional interactions terms in an alternative 
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problems, wealth and participation in various household chores. Besides, there is at least one 
identifying variable in each equation that arises by the very nature of the particular decision.26 
This is summarised in Table 3A (the Table also lists the definitions of variables). For example, an 
elderly person’s financial dependence on children is likely to be contingent upon whether an 
elderly person has any educated children, though we cannot predict any direct relevance of the 
variable for the other decision variables. Significance of educated children in the financial 
dependence equation would also reflect whether an elderly person’s financial dependence on 
children is a return to their human capital investment in young children. Ideally, use of various 
health inputs would be identifying variable in the health equation. In the absence of any better 
indicator, we take predicted value of average per capita monthly consumer expenditure (APCE)27 
as the proxy for use of various health inputs in the health equation. Now considering an elderly 
person’s contribution, current wealth of the elderly is a reflection of his/her earnings over the 
lifetime and is likely to depend on whether s/he has once been economically active. Finally, 
presence of grand children aged five or below has been used as an identifying variable in the 
participation equation of the elderly. This is because looking after the young grand children is 
often considered to be a traditional role of coresident grand parents in India. One could however 
suggest that whether an elderly person has once been economically active or has invested in 
children’s education is also likely to be endogenous to coresidency decisions. For the purpose of 
this paper, we shall however abstract from aspects of family formation and/or previous labour 
market decisions and treat these variables to be exogenously given within a static one-period 
framework. 
Means and standard deviations of the included variables are summarised in Table 3B.  
                                                                                                                                                 
specification. However there were problems of convergence in the complete model when we included these interaction 
terms.  
26
 Note that we started with the same set of variables in all the equations and then arrived at the final specification by 
dropping the variables with the lowest levels of significance. This also allowed us to rationalise the inclusion of 
identifying variables in the most parsimonious specifications shown here. 
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3.3. Correlated Estimates 
The main reason for the joint estimation is the simultaneity and the implicit self-selection: 
elderly persons who have accumulated wealth, suffer from some or other health 
problems, participate in daily household chores and elderly persons who choose to 
coreside with their children are not necessarily a random subset of all elderly persons in 
the sample. All these essentially mean that the pair-wise correlation between the family-
specific unobserved heterogeneity terms in the coresidency equation on the one hand and 
that in any of the four auxiliary equations (e.g., wealth, health, financial dependence on 
children or participation in household chores equation) on the other could be non-zero: 
i.e., Cov(ηi, ηj)≠0, i,j = C, D, W, H, P, i ≠ j. However conditional on all the heterogeneity 
terms, the equations are independent and the conditional joint likelihood can be obtained 
by simply multiplying the individual likelihoods.  
 The joint marginal likelihood function can be written as: 
[ ]
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where ),,,,( ηηηηη PHDWCf  is the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity 
components. Here ),,,,( ηηηηη PHDWCf  is a five dimensional normal distribution 
characterised as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 
27
 Since average per capita monthly consumer expenditure depends on household structure and earnings, it too would 
suffer from simultaneity bias. Hence we use the value of average per capita consumer expenditure (APCE) predicted by 
various household composition variables as well as the characteristics of the head of the Household.  
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The model is then estimated using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Method.  
Taken together, the system of five equations is recursive as health, wealth, participation 
and financial dependence on children could only affect coresidence decision, but not each other. 
It is a correlated model as we assume that the correlations between any pair of unobservable error 
terms in the relevant equations could be non-zero. Thus inclusion of the source of endogeneity 
(i.e., non-zero cross-correlations) in the relevant equations allows us to correct for the 
endogeneity bias.    
 
 
4.  DETERMINANTS OF CORESIDENCE 
The analysis is developed in stages. (a) We start with the simplest model of coresidency, where 
all four auxiliary variables are assumed to be exogenous.28 These estimates are summarised in 
column (1) and (2) of Table 4A. While column 1 shows the estimates without any unobserved 
heterogeneity (specification 1), column (2) shows those with household-level unobserved 
heterogeneity (specification 2). (b) Estimates shown in columns (3)-(5) of Table 4A allows for the 
possibility that an elderly person’s coresidence with children may be correlated with (i) current 
wealth and participation in household chores (specification 3, assuming financial dependence on 
children and health problems to be exogenous), (ii) financial dependence on children and current 
                                                 
28
 We started with pooled regressions with a gender dummy. However, since the gender dummy was significant in all 
equations, we included all the gender interaction terms with included explanatory variables in each equation. The final 
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health of the elderly person (specification 4, elderly contribution to be exogenous) and (iii) all 
four auxiliary variables pertaining to the contributions of both the elderly and the adult coresident 
children. The latter is the complete model that addresses all possible sources of simultaneity in 
the model. Appendix Tables A1-A4 show the corresponding estimates (jointly determined with 
coresidence) of financial dependence on children, elderly wealth, health and participation in 
various household chores equations respectively for these specifications. Finally, Table 4B 
summarises the estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity terms corresponding to the complete 
model shown in Tables 4A.   
 
 
4.1. Coresidence with children 
It clearly follows from Table 4B that the estimated unobserved heterogeneity terms as well as all 
the pairwise correlation coefficients are highly significant. We therefore argue that uncorrelated 
estimates (with/without unobserved heterogeneity) are likely to be biased. Hence for the rest of 
this paper, we shall focus on the estimates obtained from the complete model specification (5). 
We also compare these estimates with estimates obtained from other specifications (1)-(4) to 
highlight the evidence of simultaneity bias if one does not take account of the source of the bias. 
Here we summarise the main results pertaining to coresidency decision. Elderly persons 
aged 75 or more are less likely to coreside. This is quite a robust result as it holds in all alternative 
specifications and therefore raises the concern as to who will care for the older elderly people, 
who are likely to be more frail and sick. While male elderly people are more likely to coreside, 
widowed and separated elderly, i.e., those without a spouse are less likely to coreside with 
children.  
Next we consider the effect of the assistance provided by the children. First, financial 
                                                                                                                                                 
specifications shown in Tables 4A, 4B and Appendix Tables A1-A4 are obtained by excluding the insignificant terms 
and thus represent the most parsimonius specifications of these equations. 
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assistance from children is not a significant factor influencing coresidence with children in the 
complete model though the variable was significant in specifications (1)-(4), highlighting the 
evidence of simultaneity bias in these specifications. Secondly, intensity of health problems 
remains insignificant in the complete model, after addressing the simultaneity bias. Note that the 
coefficient is however negative and significant in specifications (1), (2) and (4) while it is positive 
and significant in specification (3). Taken together, there is little evidence that assistance obtained 
from adult children is of little significance in determining an elderly person’s coresidence with 
children.  
There is however evidence that services offered by elderly parents play a more significant 
role in determining coresidence. In particular, there is suggestion that wealthy elderly persons are 
less likely while those participating in daily household chores are more likely to coreside (and the 
result is the same in all specifications). In this respect too, one can identify evidence of 
simultaneity bias. For example, the coefficient of wealth is positive and significant in 
specifications (1)-(3), but turns out to be negative in specification (5), when all sources of 
simultaneity are accounted for.  
 To summarise, these results suggest that uncorrected estimates of coresidence 
could be misleading and one needs to account for all sources of endogeneity. More importantly, 
these corrected estimates raise concern particularly for some disadvantaged elderly, namely, those 
who are older, female and do not have a spouse (who are generally considered asset poor, e.g., 
see Drèze and Srinivasan, 1997) and also those lacking wealth, health or both in that both these 
groups of elderly are less likely to coreside. Some could argue that even non-coresident elderly 
parents could obtain financial and other support from their children. But the available information 
from our data set is not very encouraging in this respect: only 20% of non-coresident elderly 
parents with children obtain some financial assistance from their children. Similarly, only about a 
third of these elderly have children living in the same village so that they could get immediate 
medical/personal help if needed. Thus, in the absence of any extra- familial welfare institutions,  
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the state needs to come forward to protect the interests of the vulnerable elderly members who 
lack health, wealth or both or disadvantaged in other ways.       
 
4.2. Conditional probability estimates of coresidence 
It is however noteworthy that the correlated estimates presented here do not reflect the marginal 
effects of the variables. Hence, we use the estimates obtained from specification 5 to calculate the 
probability of coresidence, conditional on the contribution of adult children, elderly parents 
and/or both. Denoting C, F, H, W, and P respectively for coresidence, financial dependence on 
children, elderly health status, wealth and participation in daily household chores, one can, for 
example, derive the conditional probability of coresidence conditional on different combinations 
of C, F, H, W and P. In particular, the conditional probability of coresidence is derived here as the 
ratio of joint likelihood to the corresponding marginal likelihood function using specification 5. 
For example, P(C=1/ F=H=W=P=1) is given as follows: 
 
)1(
)1()1/1(
====
=====
======
PWHFP
PWHFCPPWHFCP  
Thus we split the sample into relevant groups and obtain the conditional probability 
estimates of coresidence for various cases, using specification 5; these estimates are 
shown in Table 5. These likelihood estimates clearly strengthen the role of an elderly 
person’s current health, wealth and participation in household chores in coresidency 
arrangements in rural India. (a) The probability of coresidence is only 7% when an 
elderly has wealth and does not participate in household chores and is not dependent on 
the children in any other ways. (b) The probability is 78% if the elderly persons have 
wealth and also participates in household chores. (c) The probability however goes up to 
88% if the elderly suffer from health problems, but have wealth. (d) In contrast to (c), the 
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probability comes down to 57% if the elderly has serious health problems, but does not 
have wealth and does not participate in household chores.  
 
  
 5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Little is known about the living conditions of a growing number of elderly in India most of whom 
tend to coreside with their children. The lack of research in this area partly reflects the general 
belief that these elderly are well looked after by their children. Using the recent NSS data we 
examine the nature of inter-generational transfers involved in coresidency arrangements among 
the elderly in rural India.  
 We argue that an elderly person’s coresidence with children is a mutually 
advantageous arrangement where both parties tend to contribute financially and/or otherwise. The 
analysis commences with a comparison of the average per capita consumer expenditure (APCE) 
between elderly persons in different living arrangements. This suggests that the adjusted APCE 
figures are higher in households where elderly persons coreside with children than living 
otherwise. The latter highlights the contribution (financial and others) of the elderly to the 
households well into their old age compared to the households without elderly.   
 Next we examine the significance of the contributions, financial and others, made 
by both elderly parents and adult children on an elderly person’s coresidence with children. This 
necessitates us to resolve the complex simultaneity problems inherent in this modelling. We adopt 
a unique approach to estimate the probability of coresidence, after allowing for its possible 
correlation with elderly person’s financial dependence on children, intensity of current health 
problems, his/her current wealth as well as participation in daily household chores. In other 
words, our approach to solve the simultaneity problem has been to include the source of 
simultaneity (i.e., cross-correlations between these various decisions) into the coresidence 
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equation. These estimates tend to reveal a more complex picture than it emerges from a simple 
comparison of APCE across different living arrangements. While coresidency with children is a 
social convention in India till today and adjusted APCE is higher for elderly coresiding with 
children, there is indication that coresidence with children cannot by itself be regarded as 
sufficient means of old age insurance. In particular, these corrected results suggest that the 
likelihood of coresidence is lower for disadvantaged elderly persons, who are older, have no 
spouse and also who lack health, wealth or both in a society with no tradition of extra-familial 
welfare institutions.   
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Table 1A. Selected Characteristics of Elderly Living Arrangements 
(All members with and without children) 
 
 Married Widowed/separated 
 Male Female Male Female 
 Spouse 
only 
Sp. + 
chld 
Spouse 
only 
Sp. + 
chld 
Alone Child 
only 
Alone Child 
only 
Ownership of 
financial assets 
69 75 51 49 64 73 48 51 
Ownership of 
property 
83 88 56 57 77 83 62 67 
Financially 
dependent on 
children 
18 35 44 24 19 48 39 71 
Financially 
dependent  
20 23 53 63 18 35 40 62 
 
Physical 
disability 
40 33.5 31.6 29 42 44 37 42 
Long-term 
illness 
54 51 45 47 59 57 52 56 
Physical 
immobility 
11.4 7.2 6.7 6.6 7.8 10 6.5 6.8 
Participates in 
daily household 
chores 
86 84  88 92 92 78 93 85 
Participates in 
social matters 
83 86 77 75 81 84 71 74 
Participates in 
religious matters 
84 89 85 84 83 86 77 83 
No of obs. 1098 5929 642 2758 153 1094 431 740 
 
Note: All figures are in percentages and adjusted for sample weights.  
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Table 1B. Welfare Characteristics of Various Living Arrangements 
 
 Living arrangements 
 
Alone or with other 
relations/non-
relations 
With spouse only With children 
 (with/without 
spouse) 
 
Owns financial assets 
(%) 
 
60 61 67 
Owns financial 
properties (%) 
72 73 78 
 
Owns financial assets 
& properties (%) 
 
56 
 
66 
 
63 
Financially 
dependent on 
children (%) 
23 20 41 
 
Provision of regular 
income (%)  
 
4.3 
 
5.2 
 
3 
 
Physical immobility 
(%) 
 
19 
 
10 
 
8 
 
Physical disability 
(%)  
 
41 
 
37 
 
34 
Chronic illness (%) 54.4 51 51 
 
Any of these health 
problems (%) 
67 65 62 
 
Able to participate in 
daily household work 
(%) 
 
90 
 
88 
 
84 
 
Able to participate in 
social matters (%) 
 
75 
 
80 
 
82 
 
Able to participate in 
religious matters (%) 
 
80 
 
84 
 
87 
 
No of observations 
 
971 
 
1766 
 
10952 
 
Note: All figures are adjusted by sample weights. 
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Table 2: Living Arrangements and Living Standards  
 
 Living arrangements 
Average per capita 
monthly 
consumption exp. 
(APCE) in Rs. 
Alone or with other 
relations/non-
relations 
With spouse only 
(without children) 
With children 
(with/without 
spouse) 
 
Unadjusted APCE   
 
370.2 372.6 (195.4) 371.9 (205.3) 
Equivalence scale 
adjusted APCE 
   
1, 1, 0.6 564.2 (734.1) 516.3 (426.8) 620.1 (593.2) 
1, 0.8, 0.6 610.0 (781.4) 565.5 (481.9) 672.2 (643.6) 
1, 0.7, 0.5 662.9 (820.6) 620.1 (527.9) 737.9 (701.9) 
Size economies of 
scale adjusted 
APCE 
   
0.8 497.4 (318.3) 498.8 (243.8) 521.6 (273.1) 
0.6 681.8 (422.1) 679.5 (335.0) 741.8 (392.1) 
0.4 951.7 (600.0) 941.1 (499.9) 1068.3 (599.4) 
0.2 1350.2 (900.3) 1323.5( (786.1) 1556.5 (956.6) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in the parentheses.  
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Table 3A. Specification of a correlated recursive model 
 
  Contribution of the elderly Contribution of adult children 
towards elderly parents 
 Coresidency Financial :  
Elderly 
wealth 
Other: 
Participation 
in various 
household 
chores 
Financial  Other:  
elderly health 
problem 
 
      
Intercept √ √ √ √ √ 
      
Age>=75 √ × √ √ √ 
      
Male √ √ √ √ √ 
      
Widow/Separated √ √ √ √ √ 
      
Agricultural labour × √ × √ × 
      
Other labour × √ × √ × 
      
Primary schooling × √ √ √ √ 
      
Higher schooling  × √ √ √ √ 
      
Presence of educated 
children 
× × × √ × 
      
Scheduled 
caste/Scheduled tribe 
× √ × × × 
      
Once economically 
active 
× √ × × × 
      
Presence of young 
grand children 
× × √ × × 
      
Per capita expenditure 
(predicted) 
× × × × √ 
      
Access to safe drinking 
water 
    √ 
      
Access to modern toilet 
facilities 
    √ 
      
Elderly wealth √ × × × × 
      
Elderly participation in 
daily household chores 
√ × × × × 
      
Health Problem √ × × × × 
      
 31 
Financial dependence 
on children 
√ × × × × 
      
Regional dummies √ √ √ √ √ 
      
Family-specific 
unobserved 
heterogeneity 
√ √ √ √ √ 
      
 
Note: Wealth: 1 if the elderly person owns property and/or financial assets. HLTHPR: 1 if the 
elderly person suffers from some health problem (see text). Progeny: 1 if the elderly person has 
any economically active son with schooling (coresident/non-coresident). Regional dummies:  
dummies for eastern, northern and southern states in India. In particular,  NORTH1:  Rajasthan, 
UP and MP. NORTH2: Punjab and Haryana; EAST: Bihar, Orissa, WB; SOUTH: AP, Kerala, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. 
 
Table 3B. Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables 
 
Variable OBS Mean Std Dev 
    
Age>=75 13810 0.0800869   0.2714375 
Male 13810 0.645402 0.478409 
 
No spouse 13810 0.199204 0.399416 
 
Primary schooling 13810 0.0907314   0. 2872371 
Higher schooling 13810 0.0719044   0.2583389 
Once economically 
active 
13810 0.27357 0.445807 
 
Presence of educated 
children 
13810 0.5736423    0.6238092 
Presence of young 
grand children 
13810 0.8929761   1.237752 
APCE/1000 13810 0.372062 0.093868 
Low caste 13810 0.280956 0.449482 
Elderly wealth  13810 0.773642 0.418488 
Financial dependence 
on children 
13810 0.3713251    0.4831767 
Intensity of health 
problems 
13810 0.626358 0.483788 
 
Participation in 
household chores 
13810 0.932223    0.2513719 
Regional dummies 
EAST 13810 0.211658 0.408499 
NORTH1 13810 0.269515 0.443724 
NORTH2 13810 0.073642 0.261197 
SOUTH 13810 0.211079 0.408089 
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Table 4A. Determinants of coresidency 
 
 No het & cor=0 With het & cor=0 With heterogeneity & non-zero correlation 
   
Child’s services 
endo. 
Elderly person’s 
services endo 
Complete  
model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.3153 *** 1.6067 *** 5.8174 *** 3.3633 *** 9.7243 *** 
 -0.0495 -0.3002 -0.459 -0.6822 -0.7688 
Age>=75 -0.2614 *** -0.7069 *** -0.6562 ** -0.8471 *** -1.0165 *** 
 -0.0432 -0.1268 -0.3009 -0.2787 -0.3671 
Male 0.3073 *** 0.5821 *** 0.5725 *** 1.1658 *** 0.7449 *** 
 -0.0387 -0.0841 -0.1286 -0.1439 -0.1802 
No spouse -0.3759 *** -1.0388 *** -2.7923 *** -2.8949 *** -5.5676 *** 
 -0.0299 -0.0915 -0.2221 -0.2344 -0.489 
Elderly financially  
dependent on child 0.7463 *** 2.2850 *** 0.8003 *** 4.9952 *** 0.5276 
 0.0253 -0.1008 -0.2416 -0.2248 0.4216 
Elderly wealth 0.1603 *** 0.3738 *** 0.4167 *** -0.4870 ** -0.3713 ** 
 0.0298 0.0824 -0.1608 -0.2254 0.1732 
Elderly  health  -0.0807 *** -0.2339 *** 0.1984 ** -0.2252 *** 0.0048 
 0.0146 0.0371 -0.08 -0.0732 0.1123 
Elderly participation 
in various chores 0.0678 *** 0.1483 *** 0.5855 *** 0.9844 *** 0.9525 *** 
 0.0132 -0.0366 -0.0802 -0.0811 0.1343 
EAST -0.0072 0.1560 * 0.0287 0.0692 0.8392 ** 
 -0.0318 -0.0804 -0.2405 -0.2094 -0.3628 
NORTH1 0.0049 -0.1995 *** -0.4432 ** -0.5265 ** -0.1503 
 -0.03 -0.0748 -0.2124 -0.2057 -0.3167 
NORTH2 0.1913 *** 0.8349 *** 0.6470 ** 0.4363 3.7402 *** 
 -0.0452 -0.1246 -0.3183 -0.2978 -0.5705 
SOUTH -0.2093 *** -0.3919 *** -0.5870 ** -0.5561 *** -1.1502 *** 
 -0.0313 -0.0823 -0.2282 -0.2089 -0.3426 
ln-L -40669.96     - -37883.1 -28178.79 -14357.89 37147.68 
NOTE:  Asymptotic standard errors are shown below the estimates;       Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%. 
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Table 4B. Structure of unobserved heterogeneity terms   (complete model) 
   
 
Structure of unobserved heterogeneity terms 
 
ηD (Elderly 
financial 
dependence 
on children) 
ηW (Elderly 
wealth) 
ηH (Elderly health 
problems) 
ηP (Elderly 
participation in 
various chores 
ηC (Elderly 
coresidence with 
children) 
      
ηD (Elderly 
financial 
dependence on 
children) 2.5041 ***     
se 0.0847     
ηW (Elderly 
wealth) -0.1624 *** 2.4231 ***    
se 0.0167 0.164    
ηH (Elderly health 
problems) 0.3051 *** -0.1180 *** 1.9397 ***   
se 0.0199 0.0234 0.076   
ηP (Elderly 
participation in 
various chores -0.1119 *** 0.5932 *** -0.1894 *** 2.0403 ***  
se 0.0245 0.0214 0.0317 0.1247  
ηC (Elderly 
coresidence with 
children)) 0.3884 *** 0.1060 *** -0.0832 *** -0.1069 *** 13.3612 *** 
se 0.0223 0.0171 0.0168 0.0186 0.9828 
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Table 5. Conditional Probability of Coresidence with children 
 
Case Elderly 
financial 
dependence 
on children 
Eldelry 
Health 
problems 
Elderly 
wealth 
Elderly 
participation 
in hh. chores 
(1) 
Joint 
likelihood 
(2) 
Marginal 
likelihood 
Conditional 
likelihood 
(1)/(2) 
1 1 0 0 0 0.002117 0.002713 0.78 
2 0 1 0 0 0.0002 0.000456 0.57 
3 0 0 1 0 0.01 0.1554 0.07 
4 0 0 0 1 0.05465 0.088575 0.64 
5 1 1 0 0 0.004322 006484 0.67 
6 0 0 1 1 0.2343 0.3003 0.78 
7 0 1 1 0 0.036696 0.0418 0.88 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 . Determinants of financial dependence on children 
 
 Zero correlation 
With het. & non-zero 
correlation 
 
No 
heterogeneity 
with 
heterogeneity  
Findep & 
health endo. 
Complete 
model 
Intercept 0.1109 *** -0.2083 ** -0.0797 -0.1599 * 
 -0.0299 -0.1041 -0.0875 -0.0948 
Age>=75 0.3538 *** 0.9851 *** 0.9451 *** 1.0158 *** 
 -0.0402 -0.1397 -0.1268 -0.1352 
Male 0.1301 *** 0.0815 0.0146 -0.0367 
 -0.0329 -0.0665 -0.0657 -0.0673 
Primary 
schooling -0.0827 ** -0.1576 -0.1997 ** -0.2102 ** 
 -0.041 -0.0967 -0.0937 -0.0938 
Higher 
schooling -0.3561 *** -0.5049 *** -0.5335 *** -0.5482 *** 
 -0.046 -0.1092 -0.105 -0.1056 
Agri. Labour 0.0997 *** 0.1061 0.1549 ** 0.1657 ** 
 -0.0284 -0.0789 -0.0782 -0.0798 
Other labour 0.1973 *** 0.7689 *** 0.4766 *** 0.5395 *** 
 -0.0469 -0.1788 -0.1635 -0.1721 
Have some 
girls 0.0182 -0.0514 -0.3326 *** -0.3401 *** 
 -0.025 -0.0694 -0.0644 -0.0652 
Some 
children 
educated 0.0010 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0018 *** 0.0018 *** 
 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
SC/ST -0.0191 -0.0377 0.0252 0.0159 
 -0.0229 -0.0643 -0.0628 -0.0638 
EAST 0.0298 0.1495 * 0.1288 0.1590 * 
 -0.03 -0.0836 -0.0815 -0.082 
NORTH1 -0.2732 *** -0.3228 *** -0.3744 *** -0.3186 *** 
 -0.0279 -0.079 -0.0771 -0.0778 
NORTH2 -0.2304 *** -0.2303 * -0.1624 -0.1086 
 -0.0409 -0.1332 -0.126 -0.1361 
SOUTH 0.0881 *** 0.2186 ** 0.2725 *** 0.2823 *** 
 -0.0313 -0.092 -0.0904 -0.0921 
 
NOTE:  Asymptotic standard errors are shown below the estimates; 
       Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%. 
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Table A2.  Determinants of current wealth of the elderly 
 
 
Zero correlation Non-zero correlation 
 
No 
heterogeneity 
With 
heterogeneity 
wealth and 
hhwork endo. 
Complete 
model 
     
Intercept 0.4219 *** 1.3045 *** 1.2496 *** 1.2224 *** 
 -0.0308 -0.1777 -0.1406 -0.1267 
Age>=75 -0.2759 *** -0.7037 *** -0.6362 *** -0.5191 *** 
 -0.0421 -0.0887 -0.0821 -0.0848 
Male 0.8927 *** 1.9519 *** 1.8410 *** 1.9475 *** 
 -0.0303 -0.0664 -0.064 -0.0704 
Primary 
schooling 0.1487 *** 0.3059 *** 0.2845 *** 0.2803 *** 
 -0.0489 -0.1031 -0.0949 -0.0977 
Higher 
schooling 0.2293 *** 0.4215 *** 0.3999 *** 0.3329 *** 
 -0.0604 -0.1411 -0.1271 -0.1249 
Agri labour -0.3734 *** -0.8426 *** -0.8422 *** -0.8480 *** 
 -0.0302 -0.0759 -0.0733 -0.0777 
Other labour -0.1941 *** -0.3951 *** -0.4591 *** -0.4301 *** 
 -0.052 -0.1264 -0.115 -0.1214 
Once active 0.0005 0.0016 0.0020* 0.0022* 
 0.0004 0.0014 0.0011 0.0012 
SC/ST -0.0063 -0.0828 0.0154 0.04 
 -0.0263 -0.0668 -0.0614 -0.0639 
EAST 0.0142 0.0582 0.0426 0.0945 
 -0.037 -0.0933 -0.084 -0.0867 
NORTH1 -0.0166 -0.0141 -0.0928 -0.1449 * 
 -0.0337 -0.0874 -0.0784 -0.0802 
NORTH2 -0.1659 *** -0.1448 -0.2030 * -0.1987 
 -0.051 -0.133 -0.1225 -0.125 
SOUTH -0.3578 *** -0.7529 *** -0.7552 *** -0.7362 *** 
 -0.0353 -0.0885 -0.0818 -0.0864 
 
Asymptotic standard errors are shown below the estimates;  Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%. 
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Table A3.  Determinants of intensity of elderly health problems 
 
 
Zero correlation Non-zero correlation 
 
No 
heterogeneity 
With 
heterogeneity 
Findep & 
health prob. 
Endo 
Complete 
model 
 
If has one health problem 
 Intercept1 -0.6558 *** -0.8006 *** -0.3844 * -0.6767 *** 
 -0.1325 -0.2309 -0.1978 -0.2218 
Age>=75 0.4402 *** 0.7276 *** 0.6175 *** 0.6656 *** 
 -0.088 -0.1226 -0.1171 -0.1235 
MALE 0.0870 * 0.3091 *** 0.2823 *** 0.3352 *** 
 -0.0464 -0.0592 -0.0563 -0.059 
No spouse 0.2132 *** 0.4395 *** 0.2820 *** 0.3443 *** 
 -0.0518 -0.0798 -0.0724 -0.0795 
Primary 
schooling 0.0002 -0.023 0.0465 0.0063 
 -0.074 -0.109 -0.0997 -0.108 
Higher 
schooling -0.1853 ** -0.3797 *** -0.2113 * -0.3046 ** 
 -0.0808 -0.1265 -0.1112 -0.1231 
APCE 0.0011 *** 0.0017 *** 0.0004 0.0012 ** 
 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
Safe 
drinking 
water 0.065 0.0823 0.1178 0.122 
 -0.0807 -0.1377 -0.1169 -0.1315 
Access to 
modern 
toilet 0.2049 *** 0.3577 *** 0.4801 *** 0.4348 *** 
 -0.0536 -0.0925 -0.0818 -0.0911 
EAST 0.1388 ** 0.2542 ** 0.0984 0.1931 * 
 -0.066 -0.1138 -0.0987 -0.1113 
NORTH1 -0.0663 -0.1096 -0.0909 -0.0604 
 -0.0562 -0.1003 -0.0861 -0.0972 
NORTH2 -0.1547 * -0.3031 ** -0.1425 -0.2991 ** 
 -0.0791 -0.1461 -0.1231 -0.1394 
SOUTH 0.0053 0.0524 -0.0714 -0.0127 
 -0.0594 -0.1008 -0.0886 -0.0986 
 
If has two health problems 
Intercept2 -1.1615 *** -1.3117 *** -0.8993 *** -1.1911 *** 
 -0.145 -0.2366 -0.2063 -0.2289 
Age>=75 1.1317 *** 1.4190 *** 1.3104 *** 1.3578 *** 
 -0.0855 -0.1226 -0.1164 -0.1233 
MALE 0.2188 *** 0.4393 *** 0.4139 *** 0.4661 *** 
 -0.0567 -0.0693 -0.0662 -0.0691 
No spouse 0.4008 *** 0.6302 *** 0.4748 *** 0.5370 *** 
 -0.0573 -0.0837 -0.0766 -0.0834 
Primary 
schooling -0.069 -0.0937 -0.0237 -0.0633 
 -0.0852 -0.1183 -0.1089 -0.117 
Higher -0.4419 *** -0.6371 *** -0.4687 *** -0.5616 *** 
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schooling 
 -0.098 -0.139 -0.1243 -0.1354 
APCE 0.0007 ** 0.0013 ** 0 0.0008 * 
 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
Safe 
drinking 
water -0.0346 -0.0158 0.0203 0.0252 
 -0.088 -0.1414 -0.1227 -0.1365 
Access to 
modern 
toilet 0.3003 *** 0.4504 *** 0.5714 *** 0.5258 *** 
 -0.0594 -0.0953 -0.0851 -0.094 
EAST 0.2902 *** 0.4093 *** 0.2530 ** 0.3481 *** 
 -0.0729 -0.1173 -0.1024 -0.1144 
NORTH1 -0.0076 -0.0524 -0.0349 -0.0042 
 -0.0647 -0.1051 -0.0912 -0.1016 
NORTH2 -0.3392 *** -0.4862 *** -0.3283 ** -0.4823 *** 
 -0.0973 -0.1556 -0.1348 -0.1497 
SOUTH 0.1377 ** 0.1871 * 0.0629 0.122 
 -0.0679 -0.1058 -0.094 -0.1032 
 
If has three health problems 
Intercept3 -2.6265 *** -2.7871 *** -2.3770 *** -2.6647 *** 
 -0.2591 -0.3212 -0.2975 -0.3146 
Age>=75 1.9992 *** 2.2869 *** 2.1772 *** 2.2256 *** 
 -0.1155 -0.1459 -0.1377 -0.1461 
MALE 0.2705 ** 0.4901 *** 0.4640 *** 0.5146 *** 
 -0.1101 -0.1179 -0.1132 -0.1177 
No spouse 0.3864 *** 0.6201 *** 0.4681 *** 0.5294 *** 
 -0.105 -0.1219 -0.1147 -0.1212 
Primary 
schooling -0.0517 -0.0774 -0.0071 -0.0464 
 -0.1544 -0.1756 -0.165 -0.1743 
Higher 
schooling -0.3837 ** -0.5799 *** -0.4089 ** -0.4993 ** 
 -0.1951 -0.2219 -0.2009 -0.2158 
APCE 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0003 
 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
Safe water -0.0518 -0.0356 0.0006 0.0068 
 -0.1507 -0.1869 -0.1746 -0.1855 
Access to 
mod. toilet 0.5197 *** 0.6674 *** 0.7881 *** 0.7436 *** 
 -0.1032 -0.1272 -0.1198 -0.1276 
EAST -0.0278 0.0938 -0.062 0.0308 
 -0.1362 -0.1656 -0.1525 -0.1626 
NORTH1 -0.203 -0.2515 * -0.2345 * -0.2069 
 -0.1238 -0.1504 -0.1389 -0.1477 
NORTH2 -0.6943 *** -0.8381 *** -0.6858 *** -0.8403 *** 
 -0.2118 -0.2459 -0.2291 -0.2421 
SOUTH 0.1709 0.2205 0.0976 0.155 
 -0.1204 -0.1464 -0.1351 -0.1436 
NOTE:  The reference category is those without any health problems. Asymptotic standard errors are 
shown below the estimates;  Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%. 
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Table A4. Determinants of elderly person’s participation in household chores 
 
 Zero correlation Non-zero correlation 
 
No 
heterogeneity 
With 
heterogeneity 
Wealth and 
hhwork endo. 
Complete 
model 
Intercept 1.4036 *** 2.6561 *** 2.9156 *** 3.1138 *** 
 -0.0426 -0.1091 -0.1507 -0.1727 
Age>=75 -0.5322 *** -0.8506 *** -1.0224 *** -0.9892 *** 
 -0.0506 -0.0929 -0.1033 -0.113 
MALE -0.0195 -0.0617 0.0382 0.0298 
 -0.0433 -0.0613 -0.0627 -0.0679 
No spouse -0.0517 -0.1552 * -0.1663 ** -0.1233 
 -0.0416 -0.081 -0.0842 -0.095 
Primary 
schooling 0.0897 0.1507 0.1677 0.1265 
 -0.0605 -0.1145 -0.1121 -0.1242 
Higher 
schooling 0.1057 0.1854 0.2101 0.1522 
 -0.0733 -0.1411 -0.1334 -0.1528 
Young 
grand 
children 0.1289 *** 0.2155 *** 0.4634 *** 0.3998 *** 
 -0.0319 -0.0721 -0.075 -0.0826 
EAST 0.0599 0.0698 0.0275 0.0889 
 -0.0451 -0.1002 -0.1038 -0.1173 
NORTH1 0.3243 *** 0.5597 *** 0.4815 *** 0.4963 *** 
 -0.046 -0.1166 -0.1055 -0.1178 
NORTH2 0.5486 *** 1.0854 *** 1.0582 *** 1.1223 *** 
 -0.0789 -0.2291 -0.2066 -0.2301 
SOUTH -0.0614 -0.1966 ** -0.2470 ** -0.1781 
 -0.0448 -0.0925 -0.1014 -0.1119 
 
Asymptotic standard errors are shown below the estimates;  Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%. 
 
